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T he Chinese room example is one of the most famous and important counterarguments to the ‘strong AI’ the-sis, based on Turing’s work, that any computer capable of human-like dialogue understands English and has 
thoughts much like our own. The systems reply has been levelled 
against the Chinese room example as a way of defending this 
claim. I propose that the systems reply fails because the heart of 
its objection is based on a non-standard definition of 
“understanding”, and does not consider the concept of con-
sciousness. Furthermore, I will argue against the Extended Mind 
thesis, as advocated by Clark and Chalmers, in which a redefini-
tion of the boundaries of the mind is proposed. I will claim that 
the extended mind thesis is very much like the systems reply. It 
fails because it creates entirely new, non-standard concepts of 
“mind” and “belief” that are used equivocally with the standard 
definitions, does not factor in consciousness, and the criteria pro-
posed for being part of the mind are no less arbitrary than those 
that they are intended to replace. 
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2. THE CHINESE ROOM AND THE SYSTEMS REPLY 
 Proponents of ‘strong AI’ make the claim, based on Tur-
ing’s groundbreaking arguments in Computing Machinery and In-
telligence,1 that any computer capable of fooling a human into 
thinking that they are conversing with another human in a writ-
ten (or on screen) dialogue would have thoughts and under-
standing in the same way as we do. Thus, any understanding of 
the nature of the computer program that achieves this gives us 
understanding of the workings of the human mind. Furthermore, 
the argument has been made (e.g. by Block2) that the necessary 
requirement for thought, which both we, as humans, and the 
computer that can pass the Turing test share, is the ability of for-
mal symbol manipulation. In Mind, Brains and Programs, Searle3 
creates a thought experiment in an attempt to show (contra 
Shanck and Abelson4) that formal symbol manipulation is not a 
sufficient condition for thought, and thus passing the Turing test 
is not a guarantee of a computer’s understanding of language. 
 The thought experiment is very simple. Searle is in a room 
and is passed cards with Chinese characters on them. He has a 
look up table in a giant book, which tells him what to write as a 
response to any given set of characters. He passes his answer 
back, and the person on the other side, who only sees the replies 
written on cards, believes he is having a legitimate conversation 
with whomever is inside the room. Since Searle does not speak 
Chinese, it is absurd to claim that, armed with his rulebook, he 
suddenly understands the contents of the discussion he is a part 
of. This is evidenced by the fact that, were the interlocutor to 
pass through a message telling Searle that the room is on fire, 
although he might pass a card back which says “thanks very 
much, I’ll leave,” Searle would not actually do so – how could 
he?  
 This experiment, then, can be thought of as analogous to a 
computer, programmed with a look up table of English sentences 
and rules for applying them. In both cases, there is indeed formal 
symbol manipulation, and in both cases it is certainly possible 
that a human may well be fooled into believing that they are part 
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of an interesting conversation with a conspecific, but the fact re-
mains that, in both cases, there is no understanding. Searle himself 
is acting in exactly the same way as the CPU – simply following 
instructions blindly. We may think of another analogy. If a heat-
seeking missile is programmed to lock on to a plane, a naïve ob-
server might describe the missile’s behaviour as though it 
“wants” to hit the target, but this talk of the missile as an inten-
tional system is incorrect – the missile only has derived intentional-
ity. In the same way, one might say that Searle in the Chinese 
room only has derived understanding, since the only thing that ac-
tually adds to the understanding of Chinese in the room is the 
rulebook, which was written by someone who actually does 
speak the language. 
 The systems reply is an objection to Searle’s thought ex-
periment in which the term ‘understanding’ is applied not to just 
Searle, but to the system of the room, the book, and Searle as a 
whole. The counterargument simply states that it is not the case 
that Searle understands Chinese, but that the system as a whole 
does. As Block puts it, “If the whole system understands Chi-
nese, that should not lead us to expect the CPU to understand 
Chinese.” Searle’s response is a good one. Imagine that Searle 
simply internalises the rule- book by memorising the entire 
thing. Remove the room. Let the entire process be in Searle’s 
head. Searle still does not understand Chinese. 
 The major error in the systems reply is that the word 
‘understanding’ is being used to mean something completely dif-
ferent to how we normally define it, and its redefinition is not 
made explicit at the outset. Rather, the standard definition along 
with the extended definition are used interchangeably. There are 
many systems composed of multiple parts that function as a 
whole in modern society. For example, the postal system is made 
up of numerous complex pieces. Whereas we might say that the 
postman understood where to deliver a letter, would we say, 
“the Postal System understood that my letter needed to get to 
Kentucky in two days”? Absolutely not – we do no speak of sys-
tems in this way. Understanding is limited, in everyday usage, 
to, at the largest, the consciousness of an individual organism. 
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Understanding, were it to occur in machines, would have to oc-
cur at the level of the machine’s motherboard, including its mem-
ory and CPU. To claim that a word like “under standing” can be 
extended to objects that are connected in such a cursory manner 
is contrary to both intuition and common usage.  
 It might be countered that we do speak in this way occa-
sionally, for example, “the FBI knew the man way headed to 
Venezuela” or “NASA announced that the launch will be post-
poned.” Although we do accept these kinds of sentences, they 
are a matter of common parlance and not a matter of conceptual-
ising the system as a whole. We could easily pinpoint the indi-
vidual agents within the FBI who knew the fugitive’s where-
abouts, and similarly a NASA statement is written by individual 
people who have an understanding of the NASA mission as a 
whole. These individuals would still have the same understand-
ing absent the agencies for which they work, whereas the room, 
book and Searle system requires both the rulebook and Searle 
together, and even then they add up to create nothing more than 
an illusion of understanding. 
 A second criticism is that the systems reply takes no ac-
count of consciousness. Searle and the rulebook cannot be 
thought of in terms of a system because the rulebook is not con-
scious, not does it play an active or direct role in Searle’s con-
sciousness. Thus, they cannot be thought of as a single system. 
The rulebook is acting as a store of information with which 
Searle can interact in order to produce the correct responses, but 
there is an extra layer of translation and manipulation that only 
Searle, and not the rulebook alone, can accomplish. 
 
 
3. THE EXTENDED MIND 
 Clark and Chalmers’ thesis of “the Extended Mind”5 in-
volves the question of exactly where the mind ends, and where 
to draw the boundaries. This question is addressed by recourse 
to a couple of examples. The first involves a Tetris-like set of sce-
narios. Let us imagine a situation where, in order to ascertain 
whether a certain shape block will fit within a group of differ-
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ently shaped blocks (I assume we’ve all played Tetris), we can 
either mentally imagine it, or use a button (which can do it 
faster) to rotate it. Clearly, we imagine the first case as a mental 
rotation, and in the second the rotation is clearly external. Now, 
imagine a case in which the ability to perform the fast rotation is 
implanted into our visual system, or, if that is too far a stretch, 
that the rotation can be activated on screen by thinking about it. 
(This is technology currently under development to assist the 
disabled.6) This seems to be a bit of both. To try and solve the 
problem, Clark & Chalmers propose the ‘parity principle’, which 
states that, “If, as we confront some task, a part of the world 
functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we 
would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the 
cognitive process.”7  
 The second example involves a man, Otto, who has mem-
ory loss, and thus must write everything in a notebook in order 
to be able to function normally. Thus, in a case where he is asked 
what he believes about a certain topic (e.g. where is MoMA) he 
must consult his book before being able to answer the question. 
Clark et al claim that this means the notebook is as much a store 
of his beliefs as the internal part of the brain in which that infor-
mation might otherwise be stored (the hippocampus?). Thus, we 
should treat Otto storing his belief about MoMA in his book and 
me storing my belief in my brain as exactly the same. The conclu-
sion of these two examples, then, is that any physical system that 
is recruited as part of a cognitive process is, by virtue of its par-
ticipation in that process, part of the mind itself. Furthermore, an 
agent’s beliefs, beings as they are part of cognitive processes, can 
be stored in any physical location, outside or inside the brain. 
The criteria supplied for judging whether or not something like a 
notebook would be a candidate for a part of Otto’s mind are that 
it is consulted often, the contents are always or for the most part 
instantly affirmed, and the resource is easily consulted. 
 In support of this argument, an analogy can be drawn be-
tween adding extra memory to a computer and the notebook ex-
ample. An external hard drive should not be viewed as any more 
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or less part of the computer than an internal one, so why should 
we favour our own internal grey matter over an external mem-
ory storage device such as a notebook? A bias towards seeing 
anything external as automatically not part of the mind is not an 
a priori reason to discount the view. Further, one might suggest 
that an actual part of the brain could be transplanted outside the 
body, kept in a vat, and connected via radio contact with the 
brain. In this case, the external item is performing cognitive op-
erations, and so what, apart from the fact that it is outside the 
actual skull, separates this from being part of the mind? In this 
case, the answer is nothing. 
 
4. OBJECTIONS AND COUNTEREXAMPLES  
TO THE EXTENDED MIND 
 To try to drive a wedge between the two examples above, 
let us consider a further example – a watch. During the day, I 
may consult my watch multiple times per hour, I will instantly 
affirm that the time represented on it is correct, and it is incredi-
bly easy to consult – a turn of the wrist is all that is required. 
Thus, a watch satisfies all three of Clark and Chalmers’ criteria. 
Would we consider the watch to be part of my mind? If an ad-
herent to the externalist view would still claim that it is, then let 
us push the example further. Imagine a time before wrist-
watches. People in earlier times consulted the sun in order to fig-
ure out the time of day. They could do this multiple times per 
day, there would be no reason to doubt the position of the sun, 
and what is easier to do than to simply look up. Thus, consulting 
the sun for the time seems to satisfy the exact same criteria as us-
ing a wristwatch. By the same logic, then, it seems that the sun, 
too, is part of our mind. Even a dogmatic believer in externalism 
might want to reconsider this assertion. It seems as though the 
criteria can easily lead us too far astray. 
 Clark et al’s assertion is that our intuitions are deceiving us 
into using an arbitrary boundary, the skull, in order to define 
where the mind ends. It is perfectly reasonable to insist that this 
distinction is not as easy as it seems to be, and questions of ex-
actly where we draw the line are valid. However, in place of this 
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distinction, they substitute another equally arbitrary criterion – a 
high degree of reliance, or “strong coupling”. The same question 
of where we draw the line is equally, if not even more, relevant 
in this case. After all, what constitutes as exactly enough reliance 
– consulting the notebook once an hour, once a day, once a 
week? 
 A further and deeper point is that our intuition seems to 
strongly disallow the notebook, but allow the external brain seg-
ment. Why? I propose a different concept of “strong coupling”. 
Rather than meaning degree of reliance, I would use “strong cou-
pling” to describe the degree to which the actual cognitive proc-
ess is ingrained and connected to the external device. The reason 
why the notebook seems so implausible is twofold – firstly, it re-
quires the beliefs to be translated into natural language, and then 
into symbols by the person before being recorded, and then the 
inverse when the information is accessed. This need for transla-
tion has a decoupling effect – the integration into the cognitive 
process seems less and less direct as we add further stages of 
translation and manipulation. Secondly, a notebook is something 
that anyone can have access to – this is something we would not 
claim for the information stored in our hippocampus. Something 
that were connected in a more direct way seems more plausible 
as a candidate for a part of the mind. 
 The watch and the sun example seem implausible because 
they are being considered as part of the cognitive process in the 
same way as the cerebral cortex may be considered part of the 
cognitive process, but these are two very different things. Check-
ing one’s watch, or the angle subtended by the sun involves con-
sulting aspects of the external world in order to aid in belief and 
desire formation. For example, knowing that the sun is directly 
overhead can cause the beliefs that it is around noon, and thus 
the desire to begin making lunch. However, the actual cognitive 
processing itself consists in the interpretation of the sun’s angle 
as a functional isomorphism for a particular hour. Like the Chi-
nese room rulebook, the sun itself is not actually performing that 
interpretive task, and thus it is not part of the mind. The distinc-
tion here is between the attributes of the physical world that, as 
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humans, we are capable of interpreting as representing impor-
tant information needed to form beliefs and desires, and the ac-
tual substantive matter that provides us with the ability to create 
and manipulate these beliefs and desires in order to produce ac-
tion. 
 To try to provide a counterexample that more closely paral-
lels the general logic of the extended mind argument, let us 
imagine exactly the inverse scenario. I wish to try and define ex-
actly what is means to be ‘part of a computer’. Normally, we 
would say that the computer ends where the boundaries of the 
machine are, yet this may simply be a bias we have. Surely, if I 
were experiencing a difficulty with a program in that it took up 
too much space on the hard drive, I could conceivably print out 
the information, and then, when necessary, input the code back 
into the machine when the program required it. This would 
mean that the computer’s memory is not only located inside the 
machine, but also on the page. Why should we say, then, that the 
paper is not part of the computer? After all, it requires the infor-
mation on the page every single time it runs a specific program. 
We should not bias this kind of storage space simply because it is 
external, should we? Now, what if I simply memorised the code? 
Then, wouldn’t I be part of the computer too? Again, our intui-
tions scream no, and for good reason. Neither the actual piece of 
paper nor my mind are coupled, or connected, in the same way 
as the actual circuits in the computer are. There is an extra de-
coupling stage, the printout, or the memorisation of the code, 
which should automatically disqualify those things from being 
part of the computer. In the same way, this kind of decoupling 
should automatically disqualify a notebook as a candidate for 
part of a mind. 
 
5. ANALYSIS 
 The reason Clark & Chalmers seem to be able to argue with 
some conviction and success is because the very term “mind” is 
being used in two distinct ways. They are guilty, then, of the fal-
lacy of equivocation. The first kind of “mind” is the kind we all 
understand when we say the word – my mind is the seat of my 
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consciousness, contained within my brain, or the parts of which 
work together to perform all of the necessary cognitive process-
ing, of language, perception, memory, etc. that I require to func-
tion. The second term, “mind” is used to denote the total of my 
knowledge, experience and beliefs. This is not the same as the 
first kind, because much of my knowledge exists in other places; 
my experiences have been shared by others, and my beliefs, by 
virtue of being expressed in language, can exist separate from me 
(as represented on a page, for example). But to equate these two 
things – the actual hardware necessary to be able to have beliefs 
in the first place, and the beliefs themselves (articulated or other-
wise), is to equate apples and oranges. 
 A further point is that the notion of ‘belief’ is also being 
confounded. In one sense, I would call my mind the store of my 
beliefs, but in a deep way, since it is the hardware that enables 
me to have beliefs in the first place and manipulate them in a ho-
listic manner. An essay that expresses my opinion on some mat-
ter is also a store of my beliefs, but in a very different sense. In 
the case of the beliefs in my head, these may be very inarticulate 
and vague – many people have beliefs that are logically inconsis-
tent. But when we actually have to pronounce on a topic, we for-
mulate our beliefs into natural language, and these become codi-
fied into assertions. In many cases, the pressure of having to pro-
nounce a particular belief may cause us to say something we 
later regret.8 Thus, the beliefs on the page and the beliefs in the 
head are not one and the same. Secondly, we often speak of de-
grees of belief, a concept for which we seem to have an intuitive 
grasp when talking about beliefs in our head, but for which there 
is no easy expression in natural language. The example of the 
location of a museum blurs these distinctions because it is too 
simplistic – many beliefs are far more complex. A further point is 
that expressing beliefs In a notebook prevents them from inter-
acting in the holistic way that beliefs in the brain do? How can 
they when they are fixed representations on a page. Thus, it is 
not as easy to claim that the notebook is as legitimate a store of 
beliefs as the mind. 
 The final point is, like the systems reply, the extended 
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mind fails to take account of consciousness as a legitimate crite-
rion for judging whether something is part of the mind. A com-
mon definition of the mind is the ‘seat of consciousness’. Thus, 
anything that can be legitimately considered part of the mind 
must either contribute to, or be necessary for, this consciousness. 
That is why we can accept that the brain segment in the vat is 
still part of the mind, despite being external to the skull, whereas 
the notebook is not, because the notebook contains no elements 
that we would call conscious, or in any way can contribute to 
any part of the intrinsic consciousness of Otto, or anyone else. 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
 After outlining the Chinese room, the systems reply and 
the extended mind, parallels were drawn between the systems 
reply and the extended mind thesis in order to articulate the 
drawbacks of the extended mind approach. These included, in 
particular, the failure to adequately factor in consciousness, and 
the fallacy of equivocation in relation to the definition of 
“understanding” and “mind”. With the use of counterexamples, 
the inadequacies of the ‘strong coupling’ criteria were presented, 
concluding with the judgement that they are as arbitrary, if not 
more so, then the criteria they are intended to replace. Finally, 
alternate criteria, such as a version of ‘strong coupling’ based on 
the connection and integration into the cognitive process were 
proposed. 
 In general, the extended mind may first appear as a radical 
and exciting new argument for externalism. Its re-evaluation of 
boundaries opens up questions of the social nature not only of 
meaning but, more fundamentally, of the mind itself. Despite its 
promise, however, the thesis leaves even the most uncritically 
accepting with a somewhat sour taste in their mouths. After all, 
where does extending our minds to a notebook or the Internet 
really get us? What new insights does accepting this paradigm 
enable us to discover? Putting our Popperian hats on for a min-
ute, it seems like this kind of a hermeneutic, below the surface, is 
devoid of real content. Almost anything, if interpreted in the 
right way, can be considered part of the mind. As good scientists, 
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we should always be rigorously testing our hypothesis, yet, like 
the monumental failures of Freudian psychoanalysis or Marxist 
historiography, the extended mind can be applied to almost any-
thing and, more problematically, admits of no refutation. 
 
POSTSCRIPT—THE MEANING OF MEANING, AND AN 
ARGUMENT AGAINST EXTERNALISM 
 This discussion of the extended mind highlights an impor-
tant confusion that plagues the externalist program, stemming 
from the definition of “meaning”. Meaning is something that 
cannot exist, like an abstract Platonic form, outside the mind. To 
assert this is to commit a gross error. Every human mind is an 
isolated universe, in a sense. The meanings that I attach to words 
are my own and only my own, and they constitute what linguists 
call my "idiolect"9 (the dialect that only I speak in quite the way I 
do). Everybody has their own idiolect that we build by trial and 
error from interactions with other humans using the powerful 
linguistic inference tools with which we already come 
equipped.10 What makes communication possible is not that 
meaning is outside the head, but that the social nature of linguis-
tic acquisition, together with shared common experiences (and 
the assumption of an intersubjective world) guarantee much 
overlap in the idiolects of different people who belong to what 
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